Abstract
It may be in the interest of low-ability individuals to subsidize the education of high-ability individuals. Sufficient conditions are surprisingly mild: positive externalities in education and complementarity in production between human capital and labor supllied by the low-ability individuals. However, tax competition and the free mobility of the educated give rise to time-inconsistency and free-riding problems which render such a social contract infeasible and result in a subotimally low investment in education.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > CESifo-Professur für Vergleichende Institutionenökonomik |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 19798 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014 08:53 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016 09:17 |
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