|Rainer, Helmut (2008): Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage: The bargaining family under scrutiny. In: Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2: pp. 305-329|
We consider a repeated family bargaining model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously. We show that: (1) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (2) women who are discriminated against have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes because they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by their male partners; (3) the likelihood that sharing rules such as \"equal sharing\" are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets.
Economics > Chairs > CESifo-Professorship for Social Policy and Labor Markets
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||15. Apr 2014 08:54|
|Last Modified:||29. Apr 2016 09:17|