Abstract
This paper provides a framework for modeling the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism how financial intermediaries incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank s reaction to financial crisis. Anticipating central bank s reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an ’interest rate trap’ - the economy will remain stuck in a long lasting period of sub-optimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constraint efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper | 
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Makroökonomie | 
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft | 
| Sprache: | Englisch | 
| Dokumenten ID: | 19997 | 
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014 08:55 | 
| Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016 09:17 | 
 
		 
	 
    


