Abstract
This paper studies alternative methods of privatizing a formerly communist firm in the presence of imperfect risk markets. The methods include cash sales, a give-away scheme, and a participation contract where the government retains a sleeping fractional ownership in the firm. It is shown that, with competitive bidding, the participation contract dominates cash sales because it generates both more private restructuring investment and a higher expected present value of revenue for the government. Under weak conditions, the participation contract will induce more investment than the give-away scheme, and it may even share the cash sales’ virtue of incentive compatibility.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair for Public Economics |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 20039 |
| Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 08:55 |
| Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016, 09:17 |
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