Hobbes to rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development

Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe und Sunde, Uwe (2008): Hobbes to rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development. In: Economic Journal, Bd. 118, Nr. 531: S. 1354-1384

Abstract

This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Bevölkerungsökonomik
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• Sprache: Englisch