Abstract
This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair for Population Economics |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 20088 |
| Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014 08:56 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:01 |
Actions (login required)
- View Item
