Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Sunde, Uwe (2008): Hobbes to rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development. In: Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 531: pp. 1354-1384 |
Abstract
This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair for Population Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 20088 |
Deposited On: | 15. Apr 2014 08:56 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:01 |