|Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Sunde, Uwe (2008): Hobbes to rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development. In: Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 531: pp. 1354-1384|
This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.
Economics > Chairs > Chair for Population Economics
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||15. Apr 2014 08:56|
|Last Modified:||29. Apr 2016 09:17|