Abstract
This paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, leading to higher investments and trustworthiness. Introducing competition leads to a decrease in trustworthiness, especially among partners. We argue that once competition comes into play, trustees perceive trustors’ investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than good intentions, which reduces reciprocity.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
---|---|
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > CESifo-Professur für Empirische Innovationsökonomik |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 20116 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:56 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016, 09:17 |