Abstract
This paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, leading to higher investments and trustworthiness. Introducing competition leads to a decrease in trustworthiness, especially among partners. We argue that once competition comes into play, trustees perceive trustors’ investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than good intentions, which reduces reciprocity.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > CESifo-Professorship for Empirical Innovation Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 20116 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 08:56 |
Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016, 09:17 |