Simultaneous search and network efficiency

Gautier, Pieter A. und Holzner, Christian (2013): Simultaneous search and network efficiency. Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Search G04-V1

Abstract

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a bipartite network. Coordination frictions arise if workers and firms only observe their own links. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network. We show that random search with ex post competition in wages leads to the maximum number of matches and is socially efficient in terms of vacancy creation, worker participation and the number of applications send out, if workers and not firms have the power to make offers.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• Sprache: Deutsch