Abstract
Comprehensive reforms often fail, despite being beneficial to society. Politicians may block comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions in which they benefit from a piecemeal reform at the expense of others. Because formal commitment devices for vote trading are frequently missing, trust and reciprocity among legislators can play an important role for vote trading. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether legislators will impede comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions even if formal commitment devices for vote trading after reform failure are missing. We find that open ballots allow for vote trading without commitment, based on trust and reciprocity. In turn, legislators frequently reject efficient comprehensive reforms in such institutions.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 20337 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 08:58 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:01 |