Abstract
This article analyzes the conditions under which the smaller of two otherwise identical countries prefers the noncooperative Nash equilibrium to a situation of fully harmonized tax rates. A standard two-country model of capital tax competition is extended by allowing for transaction costs, additional countries, and additional tax instruments. The effects of introducing either mobility costs or a wage tax instrument are theoretically ambiguous because they lower both the costs and the benefits of noncooperation from the perspective of the small country. Numerical simulations indicate, however, that for a wide range of parameter values, all model extensions considered reduce the possibility that the small country gains from tax competition.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 20544 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 09:00 |
Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016, 09:17 |