Abstract
This paper investigates parole decisions when the offender may commit a second crime after having been set free. A convicted person is discharged earlier if the cost of the crime declines or the cost of the imprisonment increases. More dangerous offenders will be dismissed later unless the second penalty has a stronger deterrence effect on them. Other results require an insignificant deterrence effect of the second punishment to overcome their general ambiguity. If this condition holds, the prison term actually served will increase with a more distant time horizon, more severe sentences, and a higher apprehension probability.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Lehrstuhl für Nationalökonomie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 20546 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 09:00 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016, 09:17 |