|Englmaier, Florian; Strasser, Sebastian; Winter, Joachim (2014): Worker characteristics and wage differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 97: pp. 185-203|
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There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence, when making contracting decisions, employers should take into account that workers are heterogeneous with respect to both their productivity and their social preferences. This paper presents causal evidence that they do. In a real-effort experiment, we elicit measures of workers’ productivity and trustworthiness and make this information available to potential employers. Our data show that employers pay significant wage premia for both traits. Firms make highest profits with trustworthy workers, in particular with highly productive and trustworthy workers. We also document differences in the strength of gift-exchange across worker types. In particular, output levels of trustworthy workers are higher and much less dispersed than those of not-trustworthy workers.
Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Organizational Economics
Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||15. Apr 2014 09:00|
|Last Modified:||29. Apr 2016 09:17|
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Worker characteristics and wage differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 09:00)
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