Logo Logo
Hilfe
Hilfe
Switch Language to English

Enderlein, Henrik; Trebesch, Christoph und Daniels, Laura von (2012): Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises. In: Journal of International Money and Finance, Bd. 31, Nr. 2: S. 250-266

Volltext auf 'Open Access LMU' nicht verfügbar.

Abstract

This paper measures \" debt disputes\" between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.

Dokument bearbeiten Dokument bearbeiten