Abstract
This paper measures \" debt disputes\" between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Junior Professor in Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 20555 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 09:00 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:01 |