Abstract
The paper sets up a two-country asymmetric trade model with heterogeneous firms,search frictions and endogenous labor market institutions. Countries are linked by tradein goods and non-cooperatively set unemployment benefits to maximize national welfare.We show that more open and smaller economies have more generous unemploymentbenefit replacement rates as a larger fraction of the costs is borne by foreign tradingpartners. These results are in line with empirical stylized facts. Additionally, we findthat the optimal level of unemployment benefits is independent from the level of unemploymentbenefits abroad and that non-cooperatively set unemployment rates areinefficiently high.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > CESifo-Professur für Außenwirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | F11, F12, F16, J64, L11 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 20601 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 09:00 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016, 09:17 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
- Endogenous Labor Market Insitutions in an Open Economy. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014, 09:00) [momentan angezeigt]