Abstract
We argue that giving up on the closure of rational belief under conjunction comes with a substantial price. Either rational belief is closed under conjunction, or else the epistemology of belief has a serious diachronic deficit over and above the synchronic failures of conjunctive closure. The argument for this, which can be viewed as a sequel to the preface paradox, is called the review paradox; it is presented in four distinct, but closely related versions.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 20711 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 03. Jul. 2014 06:42 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:01 |