Abstract
We argue that giving up on the closure of rational belief under conjunction comes with a substantial price. Either rational belief is closed under conjunction, or else the epistemology of belief has a serious diachronic deficit over and above the synchronic failures of conjunctive closure. The argument for this, which can be viewed as a sequel to the preface paradox, is called the review paradox; it is presented in four distinct, but closely related versions.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 20711 |
| Date Deposited: | 03. Jul 2014 06:42 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:01 |
