Abstract
Leitgeb [3] formulates a probabilistic theory of type-free truth that includes, amongst others, principles on the probabilities of sentences that speak about their own truth or falsity. In section 1 of the present paper we will recapitulate this theory. Section 2 is devoted to some new observations about that theory and to a set of open questions relating to it. Finally, section 3 takes this probabilistic approach to type-free truth one step further: we present two axiomatic theories of type-free probability which include, amongst others, principles on the probabilities of sentences that speak about their own probabilities. Such theories are stronger than theories for so-called second-order probability (see, e.g., Skyrms [5]) and are hoped to open up a whole new area of research in which all the expertise concerning type-free truth that has been accumulated in recent decades ends up being translated into theories of type-free probability and/or being extended to joint approaches to type-free truth and probability.
Dokumententyp: | Buchbeitrag |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
ISBN: | 9780230251731 |
Ort: | Basingstoke |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 20723 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 28. Mai 2014, 06:56 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 15. Dez. 2020, 09:13 |