Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence

Wheeler, Gregory (2012): Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 63, No. 4: pp. 841-850

Abstract

Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science; Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy
• ISSN: 1464-3537
• Language: English