| Wheeler, Gregory (2012): Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence. In: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 63, No. 4: pp. 841-850 |
Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axr048
Abstract
Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| ISSN: | 1464-3537 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 21057 |
| Deposited On: | 03. Jul 2014 06:45 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:01 |
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