|Kocher, Martin G.; Tan, Fangfang; Yu, Jing (24. July 2014): Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation. Discussion Papers in Economics 2014-36|
This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the global public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.
|Item Type:||Paper (Discussion Paper)|
|Keywords:||Global Public Goods, Delegation, Cooperation, Experiment|
Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||C92, D72, H41|
|Deposited On:||25. Jul 2014 13:03|
|Last Modified:||01. May 2016 12:50|
Andreoni, J. and L. Gee, 2012. Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision, Journal of Public Economics, 96, 1036-1046.
Angelova, V., W. Güth and M. Kocher, 2012. Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents, Labor Economics, 19, 48-58.
Aronsson, T. and O. Johansson-Stenman, 2014. State-variable public goods when relative consumption matters: A dynamic optimal taxation approach, Economica, forthcoming.
Baldassarri, D. and G. Grossman, 2011. Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 11023-11027.
Barrett S., 2007. Why to cooperate. The incentive to supply global public goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bartling, B and U. Fischbacher, 2012. Shifting the blame: On delegation and responsibility, Review of Economic Studies, 79, 67-87.
Bernard, M., A. Dreber, P. Strimling and K. Eriksson, 2013. The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common pool resource overcome the tragedy of the commons? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 91, 122-130.
Blackwell, C. and M. McKee, 2003. Only for my own neighborhood? Preferences and voluntary provision of local and global public goods, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52, 115-131.
Bolle, F. and C. Vogel, 2011. Power comes with responsibility—or does it? Public Choice, 148,459-470.
Chaudhuri, A., 2011. Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature. Experimental Economics, 14, 47-83.
Chen, Y and X. Li, 2009. Group identity and social preferences. American Economic Review, 99, 431-457.
Conceicao, P., 2003. Assessing the provision status of global public goods. In: Kaul I. et al. (eds.). Providing global public goods: managing globalization. The United Nations Development Programme. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
Fellner, G. and G. Lünser, 2014. Cooperation in local and global groups, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, forthcoming.
Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.
Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter, 2010. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 100, 541-556.
Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter and E. Fehr, 2001. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economic Letters, 71, 397-404.
Fleiß, J. and S. Palan, 2012. Of coordinators and dictators: a public goods experiment. Working Paper, Karl-Franzens-University Graz.
Froese, R., D. Zeller, K. Kleisner and D. Pauly, 2012, What catch data can tell us about the status of global fisheries. Marine Biology, 159, 1283-1292.
Greiner, B., 2004. An online recruitment system for economic experiment. In Kremer, K., Macho, V. (eds.). Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG Bericht 63. Göttingen, 79-93.
Hamman, J., R. Weber and J. Woon, 2011. An experimental investigation of electoral delegation and the provision of public goods. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 737-751.
Kosfeld, M., A. Okada and A. Riedl, 2009. Institution formation in public goods games. American Economic Review, 99, 1335-1355.
Ledyard, J.O. 1995. Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In: Kagel, J.H. and A.E. Roth. (eds.) Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 111-194.
Löschel, A. and D. Rübbelke, 2014. On the voluntary provision of international public goods. Economica, 81, 195-204.
McCormick, R. and R. Tollison, 1981. Politicians, legislation, and the economy: An inquiry into the interest-group theory of government. Boston: M. Nijhoff.
Markussen, T., L. Putterman and J.R. Tyran, 2014. Self-organization for collective action: An experimental study of voting on sanction regimes. Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Oechssler, J., 2013. Finitely repeated games with social preferences, Experimental Economics, 16, 222-231.
Ostrom, E., 2010. Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems, American Economic Review, 100, 641-672.
Ostrom, E., C.M. Tiebout and R. Warren, 1961. The organization of government in metropolitan areas: A theoretical inquiry, American Political Science Review, 55, 831-42.
Oxoby, R., 2006. Paretian dictators: Constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game, Working Paper, University of Calgary.
Sandler, S., 1998. Global and regional public goods: A prognosis for collective action, Fiscal Studies, 19, 221 – 247.
Tan, F. and E. Xiao, 2012. Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game, Economics Letters, 117, 589-591.
Tavoni, A., A. Dannenberg, G. Kallis and A. Löschel, 2011. Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game, PNAS, 108, 11825-11829.