Abstract
In the paper I discuss a prevailing view by which logicalterms determine forms of sentences and arguments and there-fore the logical validity of arguments. This view is common tothose who hold that there is a principled distinction betweenlogical and nonlogical terms and those holding relativistic ac-counts. I adopt the Tarskian tradition by which logical validityis determined by form, but reject the centrality of logical terms.I propose an alternative framework for logic where logicalterms no longer play a distinctive role. This account employs anew notion of semantic constraints. The paper includes some preliminary definitions and results in the new framework.
Item Type: | Journal article |
---|---|
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 21235 |
Date Deposited: | 05. Aug 2014 12:04 |
Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:18 |