The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals

Etlin, David (2009): The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals. In: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 76, No. 5: pp. 676-688

Abstract

I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Form of publication: Postprint
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy; 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic
• ISSN: 00318248
• Language: English