| Etlin, David (2009): The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals. In: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 76, No. 5: pp. 676-688 |
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External fulltext: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605798
Abstract
I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Postprint |
| Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic |
| ISSN: | 00318248 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 21240 |
| Deposited On: | 05. Aug 2014 12:04 |
| Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:18 |
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