|Etlin, David (2009): The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals. In: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 76, No. 5: pp. 676-688|
I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens.
|Faculties:||Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)|
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic
|Subjects:||100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy|
100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic
|Deposited On:||05. Aug 2014 12:04|
|Last Modified:||29. Apr 2016 09:18|