Abstract
Several proponents of the interventionist theory of causation have recently argued for a neo-Russellian account of causation. The article discusses two strategies for interventionists to be neo-Russellians. First, I argue that the open systems argument---the main argument for a neo-Russellian account advocated by interventionists---fails. Second, I explore and discuss an alternative for interventionists who wish to be neo-Russellians: the statistical--mechanical account. Although the latter account is an attractive alternative, it is argued that interventionists are not able to adopt it straightforwardly. Hence, to be neo-Russellians remains a challenge for interventionists.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Form of publication: | Postprint |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-21241-2 |
ISSN: | 0269-8595 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 21241 |
Date Deposited: | 05. Aug 2014, 12:04 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:01 |