Abstract
We examine whether performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is used to reduce hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. In syndicated deals, however, the presence of a relationship lead arranger reduces the use of PSD, which is consistent with hold-up being of lesser concern in such cases. Further, supporting our hypothesis that hold-up concerns motivate the use of PSD, we find a substitution effect between the use of PSD and the tightness of financial covenants.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Performance-sensitive debt, relationship lending, hold-up, holdout, syndicated debt, covenants |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B8 - Reputation in der Zertifizierungsindustrie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | G21, G31, G32 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-21421-2 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 21421 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 08. Sep. 2014, 14:06 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |