Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd und Roider, Andreas (2014): Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers. In: European Economic Review, Vol. 67: pp. 82-106

Abstract

We study optimal incentive provision for "knowledge workers", a crucial resource for many organizations. We augment a standard moral-hazard framework to reflect two key patterns: First, retention is a challenge because workers are free to leave; thereby harming their employer. Second, the value of the workerU+05F3s outside option might depend on effort on the job. Optimal contracts that retain workers exhibit properties such as first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness to changes in underlying conditions. Due to large rents, full retention is, however, costly for employers. Hence, even when socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. © 2014 Elsevier B.V.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Form of publication: Publisher's Version
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Organizational Economics
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• ISSN: 0014-2921
• Language: English