Abstract
This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex-ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. © 2010 John Wiley & Sons,Ltd.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Organisationsökonomik |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 0143-6570 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22026 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 01. Dez. 2014, 14:51 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |