Englmaier, Florian
(2010):
Managerial Optimism and Investment Choice.
In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4: pp. 303-310
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1498
External fulltext: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.1498/abstract
Abstract
This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex-ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. © 2010 John Wiley & Sons,Ltd.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Organizational Economics |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| ISSN: | 0143-6570 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 22026 |
| Date Deposited: | 01. Dec 2014 14:51 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:02 |
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