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Abstract
The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition, we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. © The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | decision making; development theory; economic theory; game theory; industrial investment; industrialization; modeling |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Organisationsökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Dynamische Modellierung (aufgelöst) |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 1610-241X |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22031 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 01. Dez. 2014, 15:13 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
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Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries. (deposited 10. Jul. 2012, 13:10)
- Information, coordination and the industrialization of countries. (deposited 01. Dez. 2014, 15:13) [momentan angezeigt]