Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information

Konrad, Kai A. und Thum, Marcel (2014): Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information. In: Economica, Bd. 81, Nr. 322: S. 244-256

Abstract

We analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome. We find that such commitment behaviour reduces the gains from global cooperation and that, in turn, this reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements. © 2014 The London School of Economics and Political Science.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Publikationsform: Publisher's Version
• Keywords: bargaining; environmental management; environmental policy; international agreement; probability
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• ISSN: 0013-0427
• Sprache: Englisch