Abstract
Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tug-of-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency fights) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement effect. This effect explains why the sum of rent-seeking efforts often falls considerably short of the prize that is at stake. It may cause violent conflict in early rounds, but may also lead to long periods of peaceful interaction.
Item Type: | Journal article |
---|---|
Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | dynamic contest; discouragement; tournament; repeated fighting |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
ISSN: | 0373-2630 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 22073 |
Date Deposited: | 08. Dec 2014, 14:08 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:52 |