Abstract
We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the 'big-man' in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members' contributions to collective output and the payments from the big-man to these members seemingly look like reciprocal behavior, even though they are driven by narrowly selfish preferences. © 2010 The Author(s).
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D72, D74, H11, H41 |
ISSN: | 0048-5829 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22075 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 08. Dez. 2014, 14:17 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |