Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

Konrad, Kai A. and Leininger, Wolfgang (2011): Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods. In: Public Choice, Vol. 146, No. 3: pp. 501-520

Abstract

We show how norms can solve the distributional conflict inside a group in an anarchic environment and yield efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external competitor. The equilibrium of the fully non-cooperative game with finite horizon has two interesting features. First, one of the players assumes a central role that resembles the role of the 'big-man' in some primitive stateless societies. Second, the group members' contributions to collective output and the payments from the big-man to these members seemingly look like reciprocal behavior, even though they are driven by narrowly selfish preferences. © 2010 The Author(s).

• Item Type: Journal article
• Form of publication: Publisher's Version
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D72, D74, H11, H41
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• Language: English