Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

Konrad, Kai A. (2009): Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition. In: Economics Letters, Bd. 102, Nr. 2: S. 109-111

Abstract

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Publikationsform: Publisher's Version
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: H87
• ISSN: 0165-1765
• Sprache: Englisch