Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D

Clark, Derek J. und Konrad, Kai A. (2008): Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D. In: Management Science, Bd. 54, Nr. 5: S. 969-981

Abstract

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R & D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival. © 2008 INFORMS.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Publikationsform: Publisher's Version
• Keywords: Contests; Fragmented property rights; Hold-up; Inventing around; Patents; R and D, Research and development management; Uncertainty analysis, Patents and inventions
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• ISSN: 0025-1909
• Sprache: Englisch