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Clark, Derek J. and Konrad, Kai A. (2008): Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D. In: Management Science, Vol. 54, No. 5: pp. 969-981

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Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R & D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival. © 2008 INFORMS.

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