Abstract
Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R & D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival. © 2008 INFORMS.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | Contests; Fragmented property rights; Hold-up; Inventing around; Patents; R and D, Research and development management; Uncertainty analysis, Patents and inventions |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
ISSN: | 0025-1909 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 22089 |
Date Deposited: | 08. Dec 2014, 15:29 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:02 |