Abstract
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
| Keywords: | Industrial economics; Information dissemination; Societies and institutions, All-pay auctions; Complete information; Externalities; Ownership structure; Silent minority shareholdings, Industrial management |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D44, L11, L41 |
| ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 22100 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 08:10 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |
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