| Bester, Helmut; Konrad, Kai A. (2005): Easy targets and the timing of conflict. In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2: pp. 199-215 |
This is the latest version of this item.
Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.
External fulltext: http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/17/2/199
Abstract
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target. Copyright © 2005 Sage Publications.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| ISSN: | 0951-6298 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 22106 |
| Deposited On: | 09. Dec 2014 09:15 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:02 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict. (deposited 30. Mar 2015 10:23)
-
Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict. (deposited 30. Mar 2015 10:21)
- Easy targets and the timing of conflict. (deposited 09. Dec 2014 09:15) [Currently Displayed]
-
Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict. (deposited 30. Mar 2015 10:21)
Repository Staff Only: item control page
