Abstract
We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez-faire economy. A key element is a change in the governments' incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not. © The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2004.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
| Keywords: | incentive; merger; profitability; trade policy |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D43, D44, F12, L11, L13 |
| ISSN: | 0347-0520 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 22114 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 09:59 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |
- Dokument bearbeiten
