Abstract
This paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time-consistent taxation similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is mobile. Extortionary governments' incentives for a policy that stimulates higher private education efforts vanish; instead they have incentives to prevent individuals from mobility-increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time-consistent extortionary taxation, but introduces other distortions that reduce workers' utility. © 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | H21, H23 |
ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22117 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 10:25 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |