Abstract
Asymmetric information about true opportunity cost in trade between a multinational and its foreign affiliate can alleviate the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment. Selling shares in the affiliate to locals is also beneficial because it increases the parent multinational's information rent that is protected from a host government's confiscatory taxation. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | asymmetric information; foreign direct investment; multinational enterprise; theoretical study |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | F23, F34, G15, H87 |
ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22124 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 11:09 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |