Konrad, Kai A.
(2000):
Spatial contests.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 18, No. 6: pp. 965-974
External fulltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718798000538
Abstract
Competition in some markets is a contest. Sellers compete for contracts by making promotional efforts. As in an all-pay auction, effort cannot be recovered even if the seller is not awarded the contract. The equilibrium location choices of sellers in a spatial model if firms compete for customers in an all-pay auction are the same as in the standard spatial price discrimination model. However, in contrast to spatial price discrimination, these location choices are inefficient if sellers' competition for customers is a contest.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D44, L11, L13 |
| ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 22127 |
| Date Deposited: | 09. Dec 2014, 11:16 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:02 |
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