| Konrad, Kai A. (2000): Trade contests. In: Journal of International Economics, Vol. 51, No. 2: pp. 317-334 |
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External fulltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199699000318
Abstract
In this paper a new benchmark case for describing international trade is analysed: trade transactions as the outcome of contests between rival exporting firms. Contests between firms trigger non-cooperative strategic trade policies by countries. In the non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium, one country subsidizes its domestic firm, the other country chooses an export tax. Both exporting countries are better off than in the equilibrium without strategic trade policy. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Keywords: | international trade; theoretical study; trade policy |
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D44, L11, L13 |
| ISSN: | 0022-1996 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 22128 |
| Deposited On: | 09. Dec 2014 11:19 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:02 |
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