| Konrad, Kai A. (2000): Sabotage in rent-seeking contests. In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 16, No. 1: pp. 155-165 |
Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.
External fulltext: http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/1/155.abstract
Abstract
This article considers the interaction between two types of effort in lobbying contests: effort that improves the contestant's own performance (standard rent seeking), and effort that reduces particular rivals' performance (sabotage). Due to a positive externality, sabotage is a "small number" phenomenon. Sabotage may increase lobbying efforts and the dissipation rate in lobbying contests compared to a situation in which sabotage is not feasible.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| ISSN: | 8756-6222 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 22129 |
| Deposited On: | 09. Dec 2014 11:25 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:02 |
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