Fortress building in global tax competition

Konrad, Kai A. and Schjelderup, Guttorm (1999): Fortress building in global tax competition. In: Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 46, No. 1: pp. 156-167

Abstract

This paper studies whether a group of countries can gain from harmonizing their capital income taxes if the rest of the world does not follow suit. It is shown that cooperation among the subgroup of countries is beneficial if tax rates in the initial fully noncooperative Nash equilibrium are strategic complements. In this case tax harmonization among a subset of countries is Pareto improving for all countries. © 1999 Academic Press.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Form of publication: Publisher's Version
• Faculties: Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• ISSN: 0094-1190
• Language: English