Abstract
We consider taxes on firms which engage in rent-seeking contests. The taxes can be on realized profits or on rent-seeking expenditures. The prize can be awarded to either the highest bidder, or to a firm with probability proportional to its share of total spending on lobbying. We find the conditions under which taxes do not reduce rent-seeking effort, generate tax revenue with no tax burden, and cause no reduction in the profits of firms.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D72, H21 |
ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22132 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 13:35 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |