Abstract
Extortion of productive enterprises ('shops') by organized crime groups ('gangs') takes place in virtually all economies. We develop a framework to study this activity. The main harm of extortion comes from the long-run erosion and distortion of useful production, as well as from the destruction of property that we show can occur in equilibrium. Among other results, we also find: gangs may increase their activity in response to increased police protection; often, but not always, forward-looking gangs induce lower resource waste than myopic gangs.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | corruption; crime; parallel economy |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 0013-0427 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22135 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 13:51 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |