Abstract
This paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good. If the agents differ in their contribution productivity, then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent. Although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game, the less productive agent becomes a Stackelberg leader. Furthermore, the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization. © 1995.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Keywords: | Private provision of public goods; Voluntary transfers |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | H41, D60, F35 |
ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 22143 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 09. Dez. 2014, 15:16 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:02 |